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Abstract
Do policies that alter the allocation of human capital across individuals a⁄ect the
innovation capacity of an economy? To answer this question, I extend Romer￿ s (1990)
growth model to allow for individual heterogeneity. I ￿nd that the value of an invention
rises with equality. If skills and talents are evenly distributed, inventions are more
widely adopted in production and users are willing to bid a higher price. Therefore,
more equality is associated with a larger share of the population employed in the
business of invention. However, inventors of an equal society are not as creative as
those of an unequal one. As a result an inverted-U curve relating inequality and the
innovation rate emerges, indicating that departures from extreme forms of equality
or inequality are growth-enhancing. I discuss evidence that agrees with the main
implications of the analysis, namely that the market size and the number of inventors
are negatively a⁄ected by inequality. Finally, a calibration exercise suggests that in
recent decades the U.S. has been in the ascending portion of the inequality-growth
curve.
Keywords: human capital, inequality, innovation
JEL Classi￿cation: O15; O31; O41; H52; J24.
1 Introduction
Reforms of the education system are often dictated by the desire to foster students￿cognitive
abilities or by shifts in the notions of equality of opportunities and social justice. For instance,
some countries choose to track students into di⁄erent school types, hierarchically structured
by performance, as early as the age of ten (this is the case in Austria, Germany, Hungary,
and the Slovak Republic), whereas others keep the entire lower secondary school system
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1comprehensive, or design some blend of the two systems. In an international comparative
study, Hanushek and W￿￿ mann (2006) found that the choice of the structure of the education
system a⁄ects the distribution of human capital. In particular, their study suggests that the
variance of pupils￿attainments is greater in a tracking than in a comprehensive system.
Another educational policy that a⁄ects, perhaps more directly, the dispersion of human
capital is the allocation of government funding across di⁄erent levels of education.1
Policy makers seem to be quite attentive to news reporting an increased gap in students￿
achievement. In 1982, an o¢ cial inquiry by the Cockcroft Committee in England and Wales
found that a seven year di⁄erence existed in pupils￿mathematical attainments. This con-
clusion had fundamental consequences in the reorganization of the British school system. A
National Curriculum established at the end of the 1980s set the target of containing 11-year-
old pupils￿attainment within less than six years of di⁄erence for 80 percent of the pupils.2
The 2001 No Child Left Behind Act echoes similar concerns. It set the year 2014 as the
deadline by which schools were to close the test-score gaps between minorities and white
students.
What are the long-run consequences of policies that reduce human capital inequality? I
propose to answer this question by assessing how a country￿ s ability to innovate is linked to
the shape of the human capital distribution.
I will argue that any distributional change in human capital puts into motion forces af-
fecting unavoidably both the demand and the supply of inventions. To gain some insights
into the reasoning that will be developed in this study, imagine an economy in which in-
ventions are supplied by highly educated or talented individuals, whose earnings depend on
their productivity and on the market value of their inventions. Final good producers ￿who
constitute the remaining part of the population ￿demand a variety of capital goods that are
built on the basis of designs created by the inventors. The larger the scale of utilization of
a given type of capital good, the greater the social and private value of its design, for this
is a non-rival good that can be replicated at no cost. Under the assumption that produc-
ers are subject to the law of diminishing returns on capital ￿intended in a broad sense to
include both human and physical capital ￿the demand for capital goods, and consequently
the value of an invention, declines as inequality increases. This result is derived by applying
the Jensen￿ s inequality to a concave production function whereby it is shown that aggregate
output is larger when inputs are used in the same (average) quantity by each producer than
when they are unevenly distributed across producers. It follows that the inventors￿ s payo⁄
out of each invention diminishes as inequality rises, a circumstance that induces a number
1Castell￿ and DomØnech (2002) document an historical cross-country convergence of this type of educa-
tional inequality.
2For a detailed discussion see S. Prais, 1993
2of them to switch from the business of creation to that of ￿nal output production. But a
reduced number of inventors does not necessarily mean a lower innovation rate, for this de-
pends on the inventors￿ s ingenuity as much as on their number. A second assumption of this
study is that a society in which the distribution of human capital is more widely dispersed is
more likely to have more creative inventors than one populated by individuals whose abilities
are closer to those of the average individual. Therefore, more inequality improves inventors￿ s
creativity but also limits the size of the market. One important insight that results from the
analysis is that the creativity-e⁄ect dominates (is dominated by) the market-size e⁄ect for
relatively low (high) level of inequality. In other words, an inverted-U relationship between
inequality and the innovation rate emerges, indicating that any movement from extreme
forms of equality or inequality is growth-enhancing.
The analysis is developed within the tradition of ideas-based models, as exempli￿ed in
Romer (1990) that I extend here to allow for individual heterogeneity. The growth literature
has studied extensively the dynamic consequences of human capital formation. Lucas (1988)
and Uzawa (1965) have hypothesized that the growth rate of the economy is driven by the
accumulation of human capital, whereas Nelson and Phelps (1966) and Romer link such a
rate to the stock of human capital, rather than its expansion over time. However, this early
literature has not addressed the question of how the distribution of human resources across
di⁄erent economic activities a⁄ects subsequent growth. Baumol (1990), marshalling a great
variety of historical evidence, argued, convincenly, that the distribution of entrepreneurial
talents into di⁄erent economic activities is the main key in understanding the rise or fall
of societies in the long run. A similar point was made by Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1991). These two studies imply that linking the long run growth of the economy only to the
overall supply of human capital, as it is done in the endogenous growth models, is unlikely
to account for the remarkable success of capitalist economies.
A more detailed review of the literature is given in Section (2). This is followed by two
examples that show why schooling can be seen as a redistributive tool. Section (4) describes
the extension of Romer￿ s model, and proves the existence of an equilibrium for a generic
human capital distribution. The aggregation and the determination of the balanced growth
path are carried out in section (5). Section (6) illustrates the links between inequality and
the innovation rate. Section (7) suggests a way to calibrate the model to the U.S. economy.
Empirical evidence in support of the main implications of the theory is discussed in Section
(8). Section (9) concludes.
32 Review of the Literature
The extensive literature on education that investigates the learning and social implications
of alternative educational system is germane to the motivation of this work. One issue that
seems particularly debated in these studies is the trade-o⁄ between the mean and variance
in knowledge acquisition (see, among others, Argys, Rees, and Brewer (1996), Dobbelsteen,
Levin and Oosterbeek (2002), Figlio and Page (2002), Hanushek et al. (2003), Meier(2004),
and Betts and Shkolnik (2000)). Heath (1984) and Slavin (1990) review studies investigating
this issue with a focus on the UK and on the U.S. school system respectively, and Meghir
and Palme (2005) discuss the e⁄ects of educational reforms in Sweden and other European
countries. Herrnstein and Murray (1996, ch. 4) contend that the increased variance in
education is partly due to the introduction of sophisticated procedures that track students
by ability as they advance to the highest level of education.3
This paper is also related to the theoretical and empirical literature that has explored
the links between inequality and growth. Four excellent papers surveying these relation-
ships are Benabou (1996b), Aghion, Caroli, and Garcia-Peæalosa (1999), Fernandez (2001)
and Benabou (2004). The starting point of the debate is the surprising evidence found by
Perotti (1996), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), and Persson and Tabellini (1994), that equality
and growth may go hand in hand. These studies spurred numerous works searching for
explanations. Benabou (1996a), Durlauf (1996), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Piketty (1997),
Benabou (2002), Galor and Moav (2004), building or extending previous works by Loury
(1981), Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Banerjee and Newman (1993), and Galor and Zeira
(1993), entertain the hypothesis that credit constraints limit the ability to invest in physical
or human capital for people with little or no endowments. Similarly, I ￿nd that the value
of an idea, which can be thought as the result of human capital investment, declines with
inequality, and that such decline is due to the presence diminishing returns on capital. But
my argument leads to the conclusion that an unequal economy may actually grow faster than
an equal one, for it is populated by more productive innovators. A similar type of reasoning
is developed by Galor and Tsiddon (1997) in which knowledge acquired by a selected group
of people generates a global externality that favors human capital accumulation.
This paper is also close to Zweim￿ller (2000) and to F￿llmi and Zweim￿ller (2006) in the
way innovation, market size, and inequality are related. They conjecture that redistribution
a⁄ects the market size because individuals di⁄er in their preferences or in their timing of
3Recently the press documented that an increasing fraction of both federal and state US ￿nancial aids to
students is merit-based. (June Kronholz, the Wall Street Journal (Eastern edition). New York, N.Y.: Sep
23, 2002. p. B.1)). The beginning of this new trend is usually associated with the legislation passed by the
state of Georgia in 1993 when it launched the ￿rst state merit program, known as the HOPE scholarship,
an attempt to reduce the ￿ ow of bright students to out-of-state colleges, and increase college attendance.
4adoption of new technologies. Here individuals have identical preferences and there is no
delay in adopting an innovation. Instead redistribution (of human capital) a⁄ects the market
size in a same way as in credit-constraint literature just discussed. There is a long stream
of research following the in￿ uential contribution of Schmookler (1966) that associates the
level of demand with the rate of technological progress (see, among others, Krugman (1993),
Murphy, Sheifer, and Vishny, (1989a, 1989b), and Słrensen (1999)). It will be shown that
the innovation rate responds very di⁄erently to a given change in the market size, depending
on whether it was caused by inequality or by technological developments.
This paper also o⁄ers an interpretation to the more recent empirical evidence on the
association between growth and inequality. Forbes (2000) questions Perotti￿ s (1996) estima-
tion and found that an increase of the Gini coe¢ cient in 0.1 is paralleled by a rise in the
average annual growth rate in the subsequent 5-year period of 1.3 percent. Barro (2000),
following a di⁄erent methodology, found a more modest positive correlation of 0.5 between
growth and inequality for high- and medium-income countries and a negative one of about
the same magnitude for low-income countries. Castell￿ and DomØnech (2002) found a neg-
ative relationship when inequality is computed on educational capital. Banerjee and Du￿ o
(2003) attribute the con￿ icting conclusions reached by the empirical literature to the linear
structure of the estimation. They contend that since the actual relationship is not linear ￿
a point that agrees with this paper ￿di⁄erent variants of a linear speci￿cation are likely to
deliver a di⁄erent sign for the estimated coe¢ cient. Voitchovsky (2005) suggests that the
ambiguity may be due to the custom of using Gini index to measure inequality. She found
that growth is positively associated with top income inequality, but the relationship turns
out to be negative with bottom income inequality.
3 Examples of Policies that Alter the Dispersion of
Human Capital
Traditionally the economic growth literature has seen schooling as a mean to accumulate
human capital. In this study I consider its redistributive aspects instead. A cursory reading
of the news on education reveals that nearly every day policy educators are confronted with
choices that involve the distribution of human resources within a school or across schools.
For instance, public schools have to choose whether or not to have a program for ￿ gifted￿
students.4 Superintendents or state legislators have to decide whether the teachers￿reward
4Samuel G. Freeman reports in an article published in the New York Times on November 22, 2006, that
Ms. Rohlo⁄, a principal of a New York City public school, decided to shut down the honors program because
it was too expensive to operate.
5system should devised so that best teachers end up in schools attended by kids with high
needs or by kids from well-o⁄ families.5 And in countries where the education system is
centralized and education is publicly provided usually the government, or the educational
institutions themselves, set a quota on how many students are admitted on each subject.
The list of educational policies that a⁄ect directly or indirectly the variance of human
capital is endless. Nevertheless, the redistributive consequences of alternative arrangements
can be illustrated with two simple examples that capture the tension of the debate on
educational reforms. Consider a society in which half of the population is born with a level
of ability (or talent) A = 1, and the other half with A = ￿ > 1: The mean and the variance
of the distribution over A are ￿A = 1+￿
2 and ￿2
A =
(￿￿1)2
4 ; respectively.
3.1 Example 1
In one hypothetical situation students learn fromeach other. A student with ability AS attending
a school with classmates of average ability ￿ AS, acquires a level of human capital
H(AS; ￿ AS) = ￿[￿AS + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ AS];
where ￿ > 1 is a learning parameter, and ￿ 2 [0;1] weighs the importance of a student￿ s
ability relative to peer-learning externalities. The di⁄erence between a comprehensive and
an ability-grouping system can be captured by contrasting two kinds of matching. In one,
classes are homogenous with respect to abilities. Therefore, the average level of human
capital is ￿￿A and the variance ￿
2￿2
A. In the other, every class has an equal number of
high and low ability students. In this case the mean is still ￿￿A but the variance is lower:
￿2￿
2￿2
A. This learning function is very simple, and yet its main implications are in line with
Hanushek and W￿￿ mann (2006) cross-country study in which it is shown that educational
achievements are more dispersed in an ability-grouping system than in a comprehensive one,
and that the average scores are not statistically di⁄erent in the two arrangements.
3.2 Example 2
In a second situation students￿learning depends on their innate abilities and those of their
teachers. Imagine for instance that a fraction ￿ of each of the two groups of individuals plays
the role of ￿ teachers￿and the remaining fraction plays that of ￿ students￿(the parameter ￿
5Larry Abramson reported on National Public Radio in the Morning Edition of November 23, 2006, that
superintendents in North Carolina are o⁄ering annual bonuses of up to $15000 to good teachers who are
willing to work in targeted schools. In the report it is also stated that "[s]uperintendents around the country
have long insisted they need to be able to transfer the best teachers to troubled schools." Apparently, in
many states union contracts do not allow that kind of action.
6may be thought as one that sets the optimal combination between students and teacher). By
attending schools both students and teachers acquire knowledge, H. The learning technology
for a student with ability AS who is matched with a teacher with ability AT is
H(AS;AT) = ￿[￿AS + (1 ￿ ￿)AT];
where the parameters ￿ and ￿ are to be interpreted in a similar way as those used in Example
1. The teacher￿ s learning function is
H(AT; ￿ AS) = ￿[￿AT + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ AS];
where ￿ AS is the average ability of the students with whom the teacher has been matched.
Again, I compare two kinds of arrangements. In one, high-(low-)ability students are matched
with high-(low-)ability teachers. In the other the matching goes the other way around. In
either case the mean of H is ￿￿A. However, the variance di⁄ers. When good teachers work
with high ability students the variance is ￿
2￿2
A = ￿
2 (￿￿1)2
4 , whereas when good teachers
are matched with low-ability students the variance is ￿
2(1 ￿ 2￿)2 (￿￿1)2
4 that is smaller than
￿
2 (￿￿1)2
4 for 0 < ￿ < 1.
3.3 Evidence
The learning parameter ￿ depends on the years of education. Therefore, regardless of the
educational system adopted both the variance and the mean tend to increase as students
advance in grades. This intuition is con￿rmed by casual observation. Table (1) shows
the test scores in mathematics of four ethnic groups computed in a recent survey of about
100,000 ￿rst-grade students conducted in various U.S. schools. It appears that the standard
deviation and the mean increase for all four ethnic groups from fourth to seventh grade.6
Still two groups can have the same mean and a di⁄erent dispersion, as it is for instance the
case of African American and Hispanics in forth grade. In addition, the table shows that the
Non-Minority group has the larger mean and yet the smaller standard deviation. It is easy
to come across a similar kind of evidence in cross-country comparisons. Table (2) shows the
pupils￿achievements in mathematics at the age of 15, recorded in a recent survey conducted
by the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) in two pairs of countries.
Each pair shows a similar mean by a di⁄erent variance.
6There is a very high correlation between the changes in standard deviations and means, as suggested by
the examples. Notice however that the standard deviation increases about three times more than the mean.
Perhaps the pattern re￿ ectes a more pronounced e⁄ect of sorting as kids advance in grade.
73.4 Meritocracy
How is the choice of the school system linked with inequality? Benabou (2000) formalizes
the concept of inequality by introducing a two-dimensional measure of meritocracy that
captures the concepts of inequality in opportunities and inequality in outcomes. Meritocracy
in opportunities measures the extent to which background factors, such as race, gender, or
religion, introduces a wedge between the distribution of earnings and that of talents or
abilities. In this paper I do not consider issues of discrimination, therefore I assume that
there is meritocracy in opportunities. Meritocracy in outcomes is instead intended as the
absolute reward of talent. Next I show that alterations in the educational arrangements
a⁄ect meritocracy in a similar way as ￿scal policy does. Assume that income is determined
according to
Y = zH;
where z is technological index, and H is human capital. Let meritocracy in outcomes, m, be
the ratio between the variance of disposable income and that of abilities. Then
m =
[z(1 ￿ ￿)]2￿2
H
￿2
A
;
where ￿ is the tax rate. In Example 1 m is equal to [z￿(1 ￿ ￿)]2 in the ability-grouping
case and to [z￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)]2 in the mixed-grouping case. In Example 2, the values of m in the
corresponding two cases are [z￿(1 ￿ ￿)]2 and [z￿(1 ￿ 2￿)(1 ￿ ￿)]2, respectively. Clearly, in
both examples going from an ability-grouping to a mixed-grouping one leads to a reduction
in m (as long as 0 < ￿ < 1) in the same way as an increase in the tax rate would. Therefore,
in principle, schooling a⁄ects the measure of meritocracy in outcomes as much as ￿scal policy
does.
4 The Basic Model
The model that I propose is an extension of the well known Romer￿ s R&D growth model
(1990), in which innovation activities are carried out by pro￿t maximizing individuals and
come in the form of an expansion in the variety of capital goods employed for the production
of a ￿nal good. In Romer (1990) all individuals are endowed with the same amount of
human capital. The objective of this section is to study the consequences of relaxing this
assumption.
The economy is populated by in￿nitely-lived individuals of measure 1. Each individual
is endowed with one unit of time and with some human capital h that are used either to
produce a ￿nal good or to generate inventions. The ￿ ow of ￿nal good produced by an
8individual with human capital h that employs N durable goods is
y(h) = zh
￿
Z N
0
q(i)
￿di; (1)
where q(i) denotes the quantity of durable good i 2 [0;N]; and where ￿, ￿, and z are positive
parameters.
The chief advantage of specifying the output function as in Eq. (1) is that the marginal
productivity of durable good i does not depend on that of durable good j (for i 6= j), a
feature that greatly simpli￿es the derivation of the demand function for durable goods. This
production function is similar to the one proposed by Ethier (1982), Spence (1976), Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977), and Romer (1990), except that here each individual employed in production
runs his own ￿rm7 and hence is the residual claimant of ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts.
Pro￿t maximization leads to the optimal condition
zh
￿￿q(i)
￿￿1 = p(i); (2)
where p(i) is the price of one unit of intermediate input i: The previous expression can also
be written as a (direct) demand function:
q(i) = (
z￿
p(i)
)
1=(1￿￿)(h)
￿=(1￿￿): (3)
4.1 The monopoly price
The market demand function for durable good i is derived by summing-up all individual
demand curves. Integrating equation (3) with respect to h, we get
Q(i) = (
z￿
p(i)
)
1=(1￿￿)
Z +1
0
(h)
￿=(1￿￿)d ~ F(h); (4)
where ~ F(h) denotes the number of ￿nal good producers with a level of human capital equal
or less than h. One unit of durable good i is obtained from ￿ units of forgone consumption.
If this is rented at rate r, the ￿ ow of marginal cost of producing one unit of durable good i
is the interest payment r￿. It is easy to verify that the non-discriminatory monopoly rental
price is the same for all durable goods, that is p(i) = ￿ p = r￿=￿: Therefore, a design generates
the ￿ ow of rent at time s
￿(s) = (1 ￿ ￿)(z￿)
1
(1￿￿)(
￿
r(s)￿
)
￿
(1￿￿)
Z 1
0
h
￿=(1￿￿)d ~ F(h): (5)
7The departure is dictated by the desire of relating the analytical results of this paper to the literature
that studies the links between income growth and inequality under the assumption that agents have a limited
access to the credit market.
9The design￿ s value is given by the discounted stream of pro￿ts that the intermediate good
producer expects to gain from renting the durable good to a ￿nal good producer, namely
P(t) =
Z t+T
t
￿(s)e
￿R(t;s)ds;
where T is the length of time during which the inventor extracts a rent from an invention,
R(t;s) =
R s
t r(v)dv, and r(v) is the instantaneous interest rate at time v: If this is constant
(a circumstance that will be veri￿ed in the equilibrium described below), the value of an
invention can be written as
P = ￿
Z 1
0
h
￿=(1￿￿)d ~ F(h): (6)
where ￿ = 1
r(1 ￿ e￿rT)(1 ￿ ￿)(z￿)1=(1￿￿)(
￿
r￿)￿=(1￿￿). In order to determine the allocation of
individuals between the ￿nal-good sector and the innovation sector, a reward function for
the inventors must be speci￿ed.
4.2 Labor market equilibrium
Someone with human capital h can produce a ￿ ow of inventions equal to ￿h￿N, where ￿ is
a productivity parameter and N is the number of existing inventions (these provide useful
knowledge in elaborating a new design). The parameter ￿ > 0 is the elasticity of the ￿ ow of
ideas with respect to human capital. Thus the ￿ ow of income for an inventor with human
capital h is the ￿ ow of ideas multiplied by their unit price:
wI(h) = ￿PNh
￿: (7)
The ￿nal good producer chooses an amount of durable goods according to equation (3) with
p(i) being replaced by r￿=￿, if the design still commands a monopoly rent, and by the
marginal cost r￿ otherwise. Let ￿ qm(h) and ￿ qc(h) be the resulting demand function under
the two market structures, respectively. Let C and M measure the number of old vintages
rented at competitive and monopoly price respectively (N = C + M). It follows that the
￿ ow of output produced by an individual with skills h employed in the ￿nal good sector is
y(h) = zh
￿[C(￿ q
c(h))
￿ + (M)(￿ q
m(h))
￿]:
This expression can be rearranged as
y(h) = z
1
1￿￿h
￿
1￿￿(
￿
r￿
)
￿=(1￿￿)[c + (1 ￿ c)(￿)
￿=(1￿￿)]N; (8)
where c = C=N. One can show that the income of an individual h employed in the ￿nal
good sector, denoted with wy(h); is simply (1 ￿ ￿)y(h), that is
wy(h) = ￿Nh
￿
1￿￿; (9)
10where ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)z1=(1￿￿)(
￿
r￿)￿=(1￿￿)[c + (￿)￿=(1￿￿)(1 ￿ c)]. At this point all the elements
needed to state a condition that indicates how people sort themselves between the occupation
of inventors and that of ￿nal-good producers have been discussed. Since such condition
turns out to depend crucially on the relationship between ￿ and ￿
1￿￿, I impose the following
restriction:
(A1) The elasticity parameter ￿ is larger than the ratio ￿
1￿￿.
Lemma 1 Under assumption (A1), any inventor has a level of human capital that is at least
as large as that of any ￿nal good producer.
Proof. Let an individual with human capital ￿ h be indi⁄erent between being employed as
an inventor or as a ￿nal good producer. Then Eqs. (7) and (9) imply that ￿ h must satisfy
the condition
￿￿ h
￿ ￿ P = ￿ ￿￿ h
￿
1￿￿; (10)
where a bar on P and ￿ indicates the value of these variables when h = ￿ h. An individual
with human capital h earns ￿ ￿ PNh￿ as an inventor and ￿ ￿Nh
￿
1￿￿ as a producer. If ￿ > ￿
1￿￿
the ratio ￿ ￿ Ph￿
￿ ￿h
￿
1￿￿ is larger (smaller) than one whenever h > (<) ￿ h. Hence the claim
Remark A1 is only a su¢ cient condition. It can be veri￿ed that the claim holds also for
￿ < ￿
1￿￿ as long as ￿ > ￿
1￿￿ ￿
￿ h
￿ P
@ ￿ P
@￿ h.
Combining Eq. (6) with condition (10) we get the key equation of the model:
￿ h
￿￿￿
Z ￿ h
0
h
￿=(1￿￿)dF(h)
| {z }
Price of a design/N
= ￿ ￿￿ h
￿
1￿￿: (11)
Notice that the threshold ￿ h is not a⁄ected by the technological parameters ￿ or z and that
it is constant over time if r and F(:) are also time invariant. For a given ￿ h the growth of
ideas, gN; is obtained by taking the ratio between inventors￿￿ ow of designs and the stock of
existing designs:
￿ gN ￿
_ N
N
= ￿
+1 Z
￿ h
h
￿dF(h): (12)
It is useful to observe that if ￿ gN has been constant in the past T years, the share of
intermediate goods traded in a monopolistic competition market, 1￿c, is equal to exp(￿￿ gNT)
and the share sold at a perfectly competitive price is 1 ￿ exp(￿￿ gNT). In this case
￿ ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)z
1=(1￿￿)(
￿
r￿
)
￿=(1￿￿)[1 ￿ (1 ￿ (￿)
￿=(1￿￿))exp(￿￿ gNT)]: (13)
11Proposition 1 Under assumption (A1) there exists an ￿ h that solves the system of equation
(11)-(13).8
Proof. We need to prove that ￿ h solves the equation
￿￿
Z ￿ h
0
h
￿=(1￿￿)dF(h) = ￿ ￿￿ h
￿
1￿￿￿￿:
Let the functions g(^ h), ￿(^ h) and P(^ h), denote the right-hand side of Eqs (12) and (13), and
the left-hand side of the above equation where the variable ￿ h is replaced by ^ h. P(^ h) is an
increasing function. As for the right-hand side of the above equation notice that in virtue of
(A1) ^ h
￿
1￿￿￿￿ is a decreasing function that goes to zero (in￿nity) as ^ h goes to in￿nity (zero).
Finally, it is easy to verify that ￿(^ h) is also a decreasing function bounded from above and
below. Hence the claim.
5 Aggregation and Balanced Growth Path
5.1 Production Side
The aggregate stock of capital is computed by summing-up all the intermediate goods in use
and multiplying the resulting quantity by ￿ ￿the quantity of consumption goods required
to build one unit of capital. Eq. (4) implies that demand for one type of intermediate
goods is (
z￿
p(i))1=(1￿￿) R ￿ h
0 (h)￿=(1￿￿)dF(h). Since there are N intermediate goods, of which C
are priced at the marginal cost (p = r￿) and the remaining N ￿ C at the monopoly price
r￿=￿, aggregate capital is
K = ￿(
z￿
r￿
)
1=(1￿￿)N[c + (1 ￿ c)(￿)
1=(1￿￿)]
Z ￿ h
0
h
￿=(1￿￿)dF(h): (14)
Similarly, ￿nal output is calculated by using equation Eq. (8):
Y = z
1
1￿￿(
￿
r￿
)
￿=(1￿￿)N[c + (1 ￿ c)(￿)
￿=(1￿￿)]
Z ￿ h
0
h
￿
1￿￿dF(h): (15)
Notice that if ￿ h;r; and c are constant Y = AK, where A = r
￿
c+(1￿c)(￿)￿=(1￿￿)
c+(1￿c)(￿)1=(1￿￿):
8In principle one can determine ￿ h under the more general condition that ￿
1￿￿ 6= ￿. However, I focus the
attention on the case in which (A1) applies, as such a restriction will be imposed on the equilibrium to be
discussed in the coming section.
125.2 Saving
To close the model, the consumer preferences need to be speci￿ed. I assume a utility function
with constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution
Z 1
0
c(t)1￿￿ ￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿
e
￿￿tdt;
that implies that the intertemporal optimization condition for a consumer faced with the an
interest rate r(t) is
gc(t) =
1
￿
(r(t) ￿ ￿); (16)
where gc(t) is the annual growth rate of per capita consumption.
5.3 Balanced Growth Path
I want to characterize an equilibrium in which the variables K;Y; and N, grow at constant
exponential rates, and in which ￿ h; ￿ gN, and the interest rate are constant. For a given interest
rate, Eqs. (11)- (13) pin down the equilibrium value ￿ h. These will not change over time
as long as F(:) is time-invariant. By inspecting Eqs. (14) and (15) one realizes that if the
interest rate is constant both output and capital growth at rate ￿ gN as well. The market
clearing condition Y = C + _ K implies that aggregate consumption also grows at the same
rate than K and Y , that is ￿ gN: Since population is constant this is also the rate at which
per capita consumption grows. Finally, the constant interest rate is obtained by equating
￿ gN and gc.
6 Discussion
To gain some insights into the link between inequality and innovation implied by the model,
I compare two special cases: In one all individuals are identical as in Romer (1990). In a
second scenario there are two types of individuals one with a high and the other with a low
level of human capital. For simplicity, in both illustrations the interest rate is exogenously
given.9
9The calibration exercise in section (7) includes the general equilibrium e⁄ects related to movements in
the interest rate.
136.1 Romer as a special case
Consider a degenerate frequency distribution f(h) with a mass of probability one at h = H,
and let T ! +1. The equilibrium equation in Eq. (11) implies that
1
r
H
￿
1￿￿(1 ￿ l) =
1
￿￿
(H)
￿
1￿￿￿￿; (17)
where l is the number of inventors. The previous equation leads to
l = 1 ￿
r
￿￿H￿: (18)
Following Eq. (12) the rate of innovation is gN = ￿lH￿ that combined with the previous
expression yields
gN = ￿H
￿ ￿
r
￿
(19)
that corresponds to the key equation in Romer (1990) ￿that is equation (11￿ ) at p. S92￿
provided that ￿ = 1.
6.2 Market Size and Research Productivity
The population is equally split between two types of individuals, denoted as type-1 and type-
2, whose human capital is H1 and H2; respectively, where H1 = H(1 ￿ "), H2 = H(1 + ")
with ￿ > 0: Let l1and l2 be the fraction of type-1 and type-2 individuals who are inventors.
From Lemma 1 we know that the most talented individuals are inventors. If this group is
less than half of the population, then l2 < 1 and l1 = 0. In this case, the labor market
equilibrium condition is
1
r
[
1
2
H
￿
1￿￿
1 +
1
2
H
￿
1￿￿
2 (1 ￿ l2)] =
1
￿￿
(H2)
￿
1￿￿￿￿: (20)
Alternatively, if l2 = 1 and l1 > 0 the free entry condition becomes
1
r
1
2
H
￿
1￿￿
1 (1 ￿ l1) =
1
￿￿
(H1)
￿
1￿￿￿￿: (21)
Since the number of inventors is likely to be less than half of the population, I continue the
exposition based on Eq. (20). To separate the competing e⁄ects of market size and research
productivity, I rearrange this equation as
1
2
l2 =
1
2
[1 + (
1 ￿ ￿
1 + ￿
)
￿
1￿￿
| {z }
Market-Size
] ￿
r
￿￿H￿(1 + ￿)￿
| {z }
Productivity
: (22)
The rise in inequality is captured by an increase in ￿. As this goes up, the demand for
intermediate products, and with it the design￿ s value, declines ￿see the term inside the
14square bracket ￿whereas the inventor￿ s productivity rises. Since an inventor generates more
designs but earn less out of each one sold, his or her reward ￿and therefore the number of
individuals that choose to innovate ￿may go up or down as ￿ increases, depending on which
one of the two e⁄ects is larger. In Fig. (1.A), where 1
2l2 is plotted against ￿, the productivity
e⁄ect is more important than the decline in the invention￿ s value for very small departures
from an equal situation (small ￿). But as the economy becomes more and more unequal,
the decline in the design￿ s price becomes the dominant force and consequently the number
of innovators diminishes. Therefore an inverted-U shape may emerge.
To see more in details why inequality causes a reduction in the price of an invention
through the market size it is useful to rearrange Eq. (6) as:
P = ￿H
￿
1￿￿[
1
2
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
1￿￿ +
1
2
(1 + ￿)
￿
1￿￿
| {z }
inequality
￿ l2
1
2
(1 + ￿)
￿
1￿￿]: (23)
The ￿rst two terms inside the square brackets capture the negative e⁄ect of inequality
￿total output declines with inequality, and therefore the rent of the inventor goes down as
well. The term 1
2l2; has a negative sign because for each new inventor there is one fewer
producer. In other words the greater R&D sector the fewer the technology adopters, and
the lower the invention￿ s value. But this is only a second-order e⁄ect that just mitigates the
decline of P. Indeed, by combining Eqs. (22) and (23) one obtains P = ￿r
￿￿ [H(1 + ￿)]
￿
1￿￿￿￿
indicating that the variation in l2 is not strong enough to counterbalance the direct e⁄ect of
inequality on the market size. (See panel B that plots P against ￿.)
Next I turn to the growth rate of innovation that is given by
g = ￿H
￿
2
1
2
l2:
Because 1
2l2 declines with ￿ when this is large enough and H2 always increases with it, the
innovation rate has a non-monotonic relationship with ￿. To understand how the relative
strength of the two competing forces are a⁄ected by technological parameters, it is useful to
rearrange the above expression as
gN = ￿H
￿(1 + ￿)
￿1
2
[1 + (
1 ￿ ￿
1 + ￿
)
￿
1￿￿] ￿
r
￿
: (24)
If there are constant returns on capital ( ￿
1￿￿ = 1), a wider dispersion in human capital has
always a positive e⁄ect on the rate of innovation under the assumption (A1). But if ￿
1￿￿ < 1,
the advantage of having a more productive pool of researchers is sooner or later overtaken
by the reduction of the market size e⁄ect. Conversely, getting further away from an extreme
polarization of human capital in the hands (or heads) of a few is growth-enhancing because
the expanded demand for new capital goods more than compensate the lower inventors￿ s
15creativity. Fig(1.C), which plots gN against "; shows the inverted-U relationship between
the innovation rate and inequality just described, 10 and Fig. (2) illustrates how the shape of
the curve is a⁄ected by the elasticity ￿: the greater this is, the wider the ascending section
of the curve. In sum, this simple experiment shows that if the inventors￿creativity (￿) is
di⁄erent across countries we should expect also a di⁄erent trade-o⁄ between inequality and
growth: Countries with poor research facilities, or more generally closed to new ideas, are
more likely to have a low ￿, and therefore are more likely to be in the declining section of
the curve.
6.3 Market Size, Productivity, Mark-up, Externalities and In-
equality
The previous experiment showed the negative role of inequality on the innovation activities
via the market size. In this section, I explore more in details the connection between in-
equality, market size and innovation when the distribution of human capital is represented
by a Gamma density function of parameters (a;b). One important aspect of the model that
will come to light is that the association between the market size and the innovation activity
is not necessarily positive.
Fig. (3) illustrates Lemma 1: All individuals on the right of ￿ h choose to be inventors and
the rest choose to be ￿nal good producers. Inequality is generated by altering the parameters
(a;b) so as to keep the mean (a￿b) constant. More dispersion yields a longer right-tail of the
distribution that contributes to increase the researchers￿ s skills. The continuous descending
line of the top-left plot in Fig. (4), representing the share of inventors, re￿ ects the rightward
movement of the equilibrium condition ￿ h as the human capital variance increases. Conversely
the (continuous) ascending line plots the inventors￿average quality relative to that of ￿nal
good producers. The inventors￿average skills improve with the variance for two reasons:
Each inventor is more able; the pool of inventors becomes smaller and smaller and the ones
who abandon the business are the least able. As in the previous example the adverse e⁄ect of
inequality on the market size can be grasped by the negative relationship between the price of
an invention and the Gini ratio ￿middle of the three left graphs. The bottom graph con￿rms
the ambiguity of the relationship between innovation rate and inequality that emerged with
the binomial distribution, except that here is clearer how it is linked to the quality and the
share of innovators.
Technological Shocks. Imagine that the ￿nal good sector is hit by a technological shock
10By taking the partial derivative of the right-hand side of Eq. (24) with respect to ￿ and checking the
sign, it can be veri￿ed that when ￿ is larger (smaller) than (1 +
[(￿)
￿
1￿￿ ￿1
￿1]
[1+(￿)
￿
1￿￿ ]
) ￿
1￿￿, where ￿ ￿ 1￿￿
1+￿; the
research-e⁄ect dominates (is dominated by) the market-size e⁄ect.
16that reduces the productivity of human capital ￿. This has two kinds of consequences. The
demand for capital goods drops, causing a decline of the market value of new designs. One
would then expect that inventors quit their creative activities. Quite the opposite actually
occurs because the expected gain of being in the ￿nal-good sector is also reduced. As a
result, individuals whose human capital is just below ￿ h switch into the R&D sector, leading
to an increase in the share of researchers and in the innovation rate. The consequences of a
negative shock on ￿ are illustrated in the same three graphs just discussed. The dashed lines
are obtained with the same parameters used for the continuous lines (see Table (3)) except
that ￿ is reduced from 0.3 to 0.25. As expected the migration of individuals into the R&D
sector causes a reduction of the quality ratio in a large range of the Gini ratio because ￿the
average quality of researcher declines and that of ￿nal good producers increases. In section
(8) I will discuss historical and cross-country evidence that tend to support the idea that a
negative productivity shock may lead to an increase in the number of researchers, whereas
inequality has the opposite e⁄ect. The innovation-inequality curve appear more hamper-
shaped when ￿ is low. In a low-￿ economy the market-size e⁄ect is weaker relative to the
productivity e⁄ect ￿ hence the steeper ascending section of the curve. But when the market
e⁄ect takes over the productivity e⁄ect, the more pronounced concavity of the production
function implies that a rise of inequality causes a larger loss of potential market for new
capital goods. As a result, the declining section of the curve is also steeper.
A reduction of ￿ also triggers two types of reactions. Capital good producers increase
the mark-up, as there is a lower level of substitutability across capital goods. But ￿nal good
producers, for a given price, demand less of each good, due to the diminished productivity
of capital. The total e⁄ect on the pro￿t function and therefore on the price of an invention
is ambiguous. However some algebra applied to Eq. (6) reveals that any deviation from a
starting value of 0.3 always causes a drop in the invention￿ s value. The middle column of
Fig. (4) compare the scenarios with a high and a low ￿.
Externalities. Romer￿ s original model considers only the positive dynamic externalities
arising in the R&D sector, namely that past inventions create useful knowledge for the
creation of new designs. But recent analysis has indicated that the largest externalities are
observed in the phase of the inventions￿utilization and that countries di⁄er greatly on how the
net social value of an invention is split between inventors and individuals other than inventors.
How does the rule of appropriation a⁄ect the growth-inequality relationship? To answer this
question I compare two scenarios with di⁄erent T. A shorter protection is equivalent at
saying that amount of innovation spillovers captured by individuals other than inventors is
larger. Formally, the spillovers are measured by c; the fraction of capital goods rented at a
marginal cost. Although a reduction in T favors an expansion of the demand of formerly-
protected products, the expected stream of pro￿ts generated by new products shrinks and
17so does the inventors￿reward. As a result inventors abandon the R&D sector. The three
graphs in the third column of Fig. (4) con￿rms this intuition ￿The dashed lines, which
represent the case with a lower T , lie always below the continuous lines. Notice also that
the ascending section of the growth-inequality curve becomes steeper with a lower T because
the market-size e⁄ect is weaker relative to the research-e⁄ect. I should also emphasize that
the graphical analysis has abstracted completely from transitional considerations. Clearly
output would expands briskly in the short run if the length of protection were shortened.
(With the parameters used in the simulation there would be a seven-fold increase in output!)
6.4 Comment: Centralization and Decentralization
It was assumed that both the production of ideas and that of ￿nal output is completely
decentralized and that the individual running the ￿rm is a residual claimant. This is a de-
parture from the more common set up in which ￿nal output is produced by one ￿rm that
hires the overall stock of physical and human capital. In a world with homogenous individu-
als, no ￿nancial constraints, constant returns to scale on private inputs, and where output is
sold in a perfectly competitive market, centralized production is a quite convenient assump-
tion ￿ although clearly not realistic and somehow in contradiction with the assumption of
perfect competition ￿for it implies the same aggregate relationships that would be obtained
by assuming an unspeci￿ed large number of producers. But an approach with centralized
production would not allow us to uncover macro relationships deriving from the unequal
distribution of human capital, because the production decisions are based only on average
human capital. To see this point more formally, consider the production function
Y = zH
￿
Y
Z N
0
X(i)
1￿￿di; (25)
where HY is some aggregate level of human capital and X(i) denotes the quantity of inter-
mediate input i. It is easy to verify that the demand for good i is (
z￿
p(i))1=(1￿￿)(HY)￿=(1￿￿).
The extent to which alterations of the distribution F(:) a⁄ects HY depends crucially on how
the aggregation of human capital is carried out. If human capital is added linearly, namely
if HY =
R ￿ h
0 hdF(h), the concavity at the individual level is transformed into an aggregate
concavity, and the link between human capital inequality and market size washes out almost
entirely (there may still be some second-order e⁄ects through movements of ￿ h). In a sense
the centralized ￿rm can be seen as bank that collects all the human resources and uses it in
the most e¢ cient way. In sum, if production were centralized there would always be a posi-
tive relationship between inequality and growth, for there is no mechanism in the economy
that counterbalances the research-e⁄ect. But ￿in line with the conjecture of this work ￿in
market economies production is decentralized.
187 Calibration
So far, I have argued that although higher human capital inequality reduces the demand for
capital goods it may nevertheless be desirable, at least up to a point, because it enhances the
productivity of inventors. The two simulations discussed above indicated that the ambiguities
in the relationship depends on the functional form of the production of innovation and
of that of ￿nal goods. Under what circumstances is the market-size e⁄ect more likely to
dominate the R&D e⁄ect? I try to provide an answer using two approaches. In this section I
calibrate the model using post-war period data on the U.S. economy using di⁄erent guesses
on unobservable parameters. In the next section, by the means of regression analysis, I
discuss cross-country empirical evidence on inequality and on the market for information
and communication technologies.
7.1 Parameters
The choice of the baseline values for the vector of parameters (z;￿;￿;￿;￿;￿;￿;￿) is quite
straightforward. The productivity parameters associated with the production of ￿nal output
and capital, z and ￿; respectively, do not play any role in the equilibrium condition (11);
therefore both of them are equal to 1. I set the preferences parameters ￿ = 0:02 and ￿ = 2; in
line with many other studies. The output elasticity to the capital goods is rarely considered
below 0.25 and it is often set at around 0.3. There are no ready estimates for ￿, ￿; and
￿. In order to pick up a set of reasonable parameters, I require that the model delivers
macroeconomic results that are similar to observable macro variables. The requirements are
as follows.
a) The average annual growth rate of per capita gross domestic should be around 2% ￿
the long run average observed in the US.
b) The interest rate should be between 3 and 7 percent. The lower bound is around the
real returns of the 10-year US Treasury security and the upper bound is the average real stock
return estimated by Prescott and Mehra (1985) ￿presumably part of it is compensation for
risk.
7.1.1 Distribution
Perhaps the most challenging aspect of the experiment is the choice of an appropriate human
capital distribution. Jones and Schneider (2006) argue that IQ tests provide a useful measure
for human capital, and should be used in growth regressions. Psychologists for a long time
have been busy in determining the IQ distributions for di⁄erent segments of society, and
in comparing IQs across countries. One of the most comprehensive survey studies of this
nature was done by Lynn and Vanhanen (2002) who created an IQ data set for 81 countries.
19However, there is a lot of disagreement on what the ￿ production function￿of human capital
looks like (Juhn, Murphy, and Piere (1993), Carneiro and Heckman (2004)). For the sake
of the experiment, instead of taking one speci￿c view on how to measure human capital, I
assume that it is distributed following a Gamma pattern of parameters (a,b), as in one used
in the simulation of the previous section. The idea is to control the shape of the Gamma
distribution by allowing its two parameters￿values to change over a wide range of values and
then identifying a region for the two parameters that, in combination with a set of values
for the other parameters of the model, delivers an income distribution similar to the one
observed for the US. The last column of Table (4) reports the Gini index for household income
computed for the Unites States between 1967 and 2002. Voitchovsky (2005) warns us that
focusing on a summary inequality statistic may limit our understanding of the relationship
between growth and inequality. Therefore I also ask the model to reproduce the income
distribution by quintiles (these are recorded in the remaining part of the table).
The advantage of this procedure is that I can match the model to non-controversial
numerical information ￿the income distribution. Clearly there are other elements not con-
sidered in the model, such as taxes or trade, that may alter the link between the distribution
of income and that of human capital. Nevertheless such elements could be added. In the
concluding section I will discuss how the outcome may di⁄er in an open economy.
7.2 Results
To gain room of maneuver in changing the shape of the Gamma distribution I set its mean
equal to a relatively high value (100) and allow b (and of course a) to vary in a very wide
interval. Given ￿ and ￿ (whose choice will be discussed below), the parameters discussed
above, and the interest rate, the growth rate gN is pinned down by ￿. The constraint (A1)
requires that ￿ > ￿=(1 ￿ ￿). Yet, there is quite a lot of freedom in picking up ￿ and ￿.
Therefore I propose two sets of simulations: one with a large ￿ and the other with a small
￿. The left-plots of the Fig. (5) compare the outcome of two calibrations, by showing how
the number of researchers, their quality, and the innovation rate vary with the Gini ratio.
In one ￿represented by the continuous lines ￿￿ was set to 0:3, and ￿ and ￿ were picked
so as to get close to a growth rate of 2%, an interest rate close to the 3-7 percent rage, an
inequality index between 0.4 and 0.46, and a distribution of income close to the one reported
in Table (4). In the second calibration ￿represented by the dashed lines ￿￿ and ￿ were set
to 0.6 and 1, respectively. The top-left graph reveals that there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence in
the way people sort themselves between the two sectors. However, the middle-graph shows
that the quality curve is steeper in the economy with a lower ￿. Indeed, in this economy
to obtain a given change in the Gini-ratio requires a larger alteration of the human capital
variance. As a consequence the conditional mean of human capital for individuals above ￿ h
20is greater. This also explains also the di⁄erence in slopes of the two plots representing the
growth-inequality relationship contained in the bottom-left graph. In the low-￿ economy a
0.1 change in the Gini coe¢ cient in the range 0.25-0.5 ￿many advanced economies fall into
this range￿is associated with about a quarter percentage faster innovation rate, whereas in
the high-￿ economy the acceleration is about 0.13%. To discern between the two cases I
compared snapshots of the income U.S. distribution since the late 1960s with the outcome
of the two calibrations. The two graphs on the right column of the Fig. (5), which plot the
quintiles of the distribution against the Gini ratio, shows that the model does a better job
in replicating the income distribution when ￿ is 0:3.
Conclusion 1 Under a parametrization of the production functions that replicates well the
post-war growth average income and its distribution the slope of the inequality-innovation
rate curve is about 0.025, implying that a change in the Gini coe¢ cient of 0.1 is associated
with a 0.25% change of the innovation rate. This is about half the slope￿ s value estimated
by Barro (2000) for the group of medium and high income countries. When ￿ and ￿ are
relatively large (0:6 and 1, respectively) the acceleration implied by the calibration is lower
(approximately 0.13%) and the ￿tting of the income distribution is poorer.
8 Empirical Evidence
It was conjectured that the negative consequences of inequality on growth are due to the
diminished capacity of the economy in absorbing new capital goods. I test this proposition
by using US and international data on the consumption of electronic products and on income
inequality. Data on U.S. inequality by state is drawn form the U.S. census, which calculates
the Gini ratios on the basis of household surveys conducted at a 10-year interval. The
Current Population Survey (CPS) records data on computer ownership at the household
level since 1984, but the oldest available data by states was recorded in the September 2001
survey. 11 The cross-section data are taken from various issues of the Human Development
Report (HDR) produced by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).
United States. The outcome of a least square regression in which the dependent variable
is computer ownership and the dependent variables are average income and the Gini ratios
are reported in Table (5). Although in 2001 computers were already widely spread12 there
is enough variation in the data to deliver coe¢ cients associated with the two explanatory
variables that are separately and jointly signi￿cantly di⁄erent than zero. Furthermore the
11One place where they can be found is http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/state/state4.html
12The data can be found at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/computer.html
Correspondence with a Census o¢ cial con￿rmed that state level data was very spotty until 2001 and
therefore have not been included in the o¢ cial statistics.
21inequality coe¢ cient has the sign predicted by the model: For a given level of income the
market for computers is larger in states with a lower income inequality.
Cross-Country Estimation. The UNPD does not survey the households ownership of
computers but only internet use. Assuming a high correlation between the two sets of
survey data, I ran a similar regression to the one just described on a group of 95 countries.
The top-right panel of Table (6) indicates that the slope associated to inequality is negative
although only marginally signi￿cantly di⁄erent than zero (P-value is about 0.15). Similarly,
I obtain a negative coe¢ cient, but not statistically signi￿cant, when the dependent variable
is the percentage of cellular phones. But the bottom two panels, that reports estimation
results when mainline telephones in 1990 and 2004 are proxies for market size, indicate a
much stronger relationship: the inequality coe¢ cient has the predicted negative sign and is
highly signi￿cant (P-value<0.01).
A second class of implications concerns the link between innovation activity and inequal-
ity. It was stated that an equal economy is likely to have more inventors than an unequal
one because the demand for capital goods there is greater. I verify the hypothesis by re-
gressing the number of researchers on inequality and average income using UNDP data on
68 countries. The outcome of this regression, which is collected in the left-hand side of Table
(7), indicates that the hypothesis is not rejected with a high level of con￿dence (the P-value
below 0.01).
In section (6.3) was observed that the model does not always imply a rise (fall) in the
number of researchers when the demand expands (shrinks). If the fall in demand is caused
by a negative shock on human capital productivity in the ￿nal good sector, the business
of invention becomes suddenly more attractive, notwithstanding the lower value of an inno-
vation. There is some appealing historical evidence suggesting that a phenomenon of this
kind has occurred in the United States. The economic historian Fano (1987) documents
a dramatic rise in research personnel during the Great Depression years ￿of a magnitude
of about 300% between 1921 and 1938 ￿ and in the number of laboratories ￿these rose
from fewer than 300 in 1920 to more than 2,200 in 1938. The boom in industrial research
was not entirely driven by product innovation ￿the type of innovation assumed here ￿for
many entrepreneurs seemed to be especially interested in cost-reducing innovations. How-
ever, Fano argues that in this period a large number of new products were being developed
as well, especially in the large-scale enterprises, such as electric refrigerators, rayon, washing
machines, and radios.
It is considerably more di¢ cult to ￿nd cross-country data on the economic value of
an innovation. The monetary value of patents has been estimated with indirect measures,
such as the number of citations that patents receive after their publication (see Hall, Ja⁄e,
and Trajtenberg (2005)), the renewal fees paid by the patent holders to extend the patent
22protection (Pakes (1986)), the number of backward citations to other patents, and through
a composite indicator of quality of patents (Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004)). Building on
these contributions one could test the hypothesis that a country with an unequal distribution
of human capital generates fewer patents (per person) than those generated in a relatively
more equal country, and that the patents produced in the unequal countries are nevertheless
cited more often.
9 Conclusion
This study proposed to interpret the con￿ icting evidence on the relationship between inequal-
ity and growth documented by the empirical macro literature as the result of two contrasting
forces that are put into motion by a rise in human capital dispersion. One is the improved
productivity of inventors, and the other the diminished market value of a design. It was
shown that an inverted-U relationship between the innovation rate and inequality is likely
to emerge, that is, going away from an extreme form of equality or inequality is growth-
enhancing. A departure from an extreme form of inequality induces a sizable increase in the
demand for new capital goods, and in the market value of patents. Therefore a larger number
of talented individuals are willing to devote themselves into creative activities. Conversely,
a society that is extremely worried in reaching equality in knowledge acquisition is unlikely
to reap the bene￿ts of extraordinary minds.
Through a number of simulations I have shown how the intensity of innovation activities
and the shape of the inequality-growth change when some fundamental parameters of the
economy are altered. Not surprisingly, if the inventors￿ability to appropriate the social value
of a design weakens, the market-size e⁄ect is weaker. A less obvious result emerged while
investigating the way the economy responds to a drop in the demand for capital goods. If
this is caused by inequality, the overall market for capital goods su⁄ers, because on average
producers are less productive and choose (on average) a smaller production scale. But when
drop is due to a negative technological shock on human capital productivity the creative
activity intensi￿es because the reduced prospect of earnings as producers induce some former
producers to become inventors. A combination of historical and empirical evidence indicated
that either mechanism may be in place at any given time. Hence an open question to be
investigated more carefully is under which conditions a decline in the demand for capital
goods is detrimental for innovation.
One simulation and a calibration exercise provided suggestions on how to identify the
inequality-innovation curve. A country with e¢ cient research institutions and open to the
acceptance of new ideas is more likely to be on the ascending section of the curve. The
calibration exercise based on post-war U.S. data indicated the possibility that in recent
23decades the U.S. (and countries with similar macro parameters) has been in that portion of
the curve. In particular, the slope calculated under a preferred set of parameters (￿ = ￿ = 0:3
and ￿ = 0:6) implied that a 0.1 rise of the income Gini index ￿a variation that is greater
than the one observed in the U.S. since the 1960s ￿is paralleled with a faster innovation rate
of about 0.25%. This is about half the magnitude of the partial correlation estimated by
Barro (2000) between the (residual) average rate of per capita income and the Gini coe¢ cient
for a set of medium- and high-income countries, and about a ￿fth of a similar estimation
performed by Forbes (2000).
Finally, I would like to mention two additional open issues for future research. This work
could be extended to investigate how the shape of the skill distribution a⁄ects the direction
of trade of capital goods and of inventions. In a working paper version of this study, I
conjectured that the more unequal economy tends to specialize in the business of creation
and the equal economy in that of actual production. Another aspect worth investigating
is how the dynamic consequences of a change in the distribution depend on nature of the
social or technological developments that altered the distribution. How does the market-size
e⁄ect relate to the creativity e⁄ect when the shape of the distribution is disturbed by social
innovations such as the elimination or the introduction of some form of religious, gender or
ethnic discrimination?
24References
Aghion, P., and P. Bolton. (1997). "A Theory of Trickle-Down Growth and Development,"
Review of Economics Studies 64 (2), 151-172.
Aghion, P., E. Caroli, and C. Garcia-Peæalosa. (1999). "Inequality and Economic Growth:
The Perspective of the New Growth Theories," Journal of Economic Literature 37 (4), 1615-
60.
Alesina, A., and D. Rodrik. (1994). "Distributive Politics and Economic Growth," Quarterly
Journal of Economics 109(2), 465-90.
Argys, L. M., D. I. Rees, and D. J. Brewer. (1996). "Detracking America￿ s Schools: Equity
at Zero Cost?" Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 15, 623-645.
Atkinson, A.B. (1980). Social Justice and Public Policy. The MIT Press
Barro, Robert J. (2000). "Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries," Journal of
Economic Growth 5(1), 5-32.
Banerjee, A. V., and A. F. Newman. (1993). "Occupational Choice and the Process of
Development," Journal of Political Economy 101, 274-298.
Bandyopadhyay, D. and P. Basu. (2005). "What Drives the Cross-country Growth and
Inequality Correlation?" The Canadian Journal of Economics 38(4), 1272-97.
Banerjee, A. V. and E. Du￿ o (2003). "Inequality and Growth: What Can the Data Say?"
Journal of Economic Growth 8, 267-99.
Baumol, W. J. (1990). "Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive,"
Journal of Political Economy 98 (5), 893-921.
Benabou, R. (1996a). "Heterogeneity, Strati￿cation, and Growth: Macroeconomic Impli-
cations of Community Structure and School Finance," American Economic Review 86(3),
584-609.
Benabou, R. (1996b). "Inequality and Growth," in B. Bernanke and J. Rotemberg, eds.,
NBER Macroeconomic Annual, 11-74. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Benabou, R. (2000). "Meritocracy, Redistribution, and the Size of the Pie," in Kenneth Ar-
row, Samuel Bowles and Steven Durlauf, eds., Meritocracy and Economic Inequality, Prince-
ton University Press, 317-39,
Benabou, R. (2002). "Tax and Education Policy in a Heterogeneous-Agent Economy: What
Levels of Redistribution Maximize Growth and E¢ ciency?" Econometrica 70(2), 481-517.
Benabou, R. (2004). "Inequality, Technology, and the Social Contract," National Bureau of
Economic Research, Inc., NBER Working Papers: 10371.
Betts, J. R., J. L. Shkolnik. (2000). "The E⁄ects of Ability Grouping on Student Achieve-
ment and Resource Allocation in Secondary Schools," Economics of Education Review 19,
1-15.
25Carneiro, P. and J. Heckman. (2003). "Human Capital Policy," NBER Working Paper
Series, Working Paper 9495.
Castell￿, M. A. and R. DomØnech (2002). "Human Capital Inequality and Economic Growth:
Some New Evidence," Economic Journal 112 (478), C187-200.
DeNavas-Walt, C. and R. Cleveland. (2002). "Monetary Income in the United States:
2001," Current Population Reports, P60-218, U.S. Census Bureau. Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing O¢ ce.
Dixit, A. K. and J. E. Stiglitz. (1977). "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product
Diversity," American Economic Review 67, 297-308.
Dobbelsteen, S., J. Levin, and H. Oosterbeek. (2002). "The Causal E⁄ect of Class Size
on Scholastic Achievement: Distinguishing the Pure Class Size E⁄ect from the E⁄ect of
Changes in Class Composition," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 64, 17-38.
Durlauf, S. (1996). "A Theory of Persistent Income Inequality," Journal of Economic Growth
1, 75-94.
Ethier, W. J. (1982). "National and International Returns to Scale in the Modern Theory
of International Trade," American Economic Review 72, 389-405.
Evans, D. S. and B. Jovanovic. (1989). "An Estimated Model of Entrepreneurial Choice
under Liquidity Constraints," Journal of Political Economy 97(4), 808-27.
Fano, E. (1987). "Technical Progress as a Destabilizing Factor and as an Agent of Recovery
in the United States between the Two World Wars," History and Technology 3, 249-274.
Fernandez, R. (2001). "Sorting, Education and Inequality," National Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc., NBER Working Papers: 8101.
Figlio, D. N. and M. E. Page. (2002). "School Choice and the Distributional E⁄ects of
Ability Tracking: Does Separation Increase Inequality?" Journal of Urban Economics 51,
497-514.
F￿llmi, R. and J. Zweim￿ller. (2006). "Income Distribution and Demand-Induced Innova-
tions," Review of Economic Studies, 73 (4), 941-960.
Forbes, K. J. (2000). "A Reassessment of the Relationship between Inequality and Growth,"
American Economic Review 90(4), 869-87.
Galor, O. and D. Tsiddon. (1997). "The Distribution of Human Capital and Economic
Growth," Journal of Economic Growth 2(1), 93-124.
Galor, O., J. Zeira. (1993). "Income Distribution and Macroeconomics," Review of Economic
Studies 60, 35-52.
Hall, B. H., Ja⁄e, A., and M. Trajtenberg. (2005). "Market Value and Patent Citations,"
RAND Journal of Economics 35(1), 16-38.
Hanushek, E. A., et al. (2003). "Does Peer Ability A⁄ect Student Achievement?" Journal
of Applied Econometrics 18, 527-544.
26Hanushek, E. A., L. W￿￿ mann. (2006). "Does Educational Tracking A⁄ect Performance
and Inequality? Di⁄erences-in-Di⁄erences Evidence across Countries," Economic Journal
119, C63-C76.
Heath, Anthony, ed. (1984). "Comprehensive and Selective Schooling," special Issue of the
Oxford Review of Education 10, 6-123.
Herrnstein, R. J. and C. Murray. (1994). The Bell Curve. New York: Free Press.
Jones, G. and W. J. Schneider. (2006). "Intelligence, Human Capital, and Economic Growth:
A Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) Approach," Journal of Economic
Growth, 11(1), 71-93
Juhn, C., K. M. Murphy, and B. Pierce. (1993). "Wage Inequality and the Rise in Returns
to Skill," Journal of Political Economy 101 (3), 410-42.
Krugman, P. R. (1993). "Toward a Counter-Counterrevolution in Development Theory,"
Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, 1992: Sup-
plement to The World Bank Economic Review and The World Bank Research Observer,
15-38.
Lanjouw, J. O., and M. Schankerman. (2004). "Patent Quality and Research Productivity:
Measuring Innovation with Multiple Indicators," Economic Journal 114 (495), 441-465.
Loury, G. (1981). "Intergenerational Tranfers and the Distribution of Earnings," Economet-
rica 49, 843-867.
Lucas, R. E. (1988). "On the Mechanics of Economic Development," Journal of Monetary
Economics 22(1), 3-42.
Lynn, R. and T. Vanhanen. (2002). IQ and the Wealth of Nations. Praeger Publishers.
Westport CT.
McCall, M., et al. (2006). "Achievement Gaps: An Examination of Di⁄erences in Student
Achievement and Growth," Northwest Evaluation Association, November 2006.
Meghir C. and M. Palme. (2005). "Educational Reform, Ability, and Family Background,"
American Economic Review, 95(1), 414-424.
Mehra, R., E. C. Prescott. (1985). "The Equity Risk Premium: A Puzzle," Journal of
Monetary Economics 15 (2), 145-61.
Meier, V. (2004). "Choosing between School Systems: The Risk of Failure," FinanzArchiv
60, 83-93.
Murphy, K., Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny. (1991). "The Allocation of Talent: Implications
for Growth," Quarterly Journal of Economics 106(2), 503-30.
Murphy, K., Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny. (1989a). "Income Distribution, Market Size,
and Industrialization," Quarterly Journal of Economics 104(3), 537-64.
Murphy, K., Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny. (1989b). "Industrialization and the Big Push,"
Journal of Political Economy 97(5), 1003-26.
27Nelson, R. R. and E. S. Phelps. (1996). "Investment in Humans, Technological Di⁄usion
and Economic Growth," American Economic Review 56, May, 69-75.
OECD (2003). PISA 2003 Database. http://pisaweb.acer.edu.au.
OECD (2005). OECD in Figures 2005: Education Expenditure. http://www.oecd.org.
Pakes, A. (1986). "Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the Value of Holding European
Patent Stocks," Econometrica 54 (4), 755-784.
Perotti, R. (1996). "Growth, Income Distribution, and Democracy: What the Data Say,"
Journal of Economic Growth 1 (2), 149-87.
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (1994). "Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?" American Eco-
nomic Review 84 (3): 600-21.
Piketty, T. (1997). "The Dynamics of the Wealth Distribution and Interest Rate with
Credit-Rating," Review of Economic Studies 64, 173-190.
Prais, S. (1993). "Economic Performance and Education," Proceedings of the British Acad-
emy, 84, 151-207.
Romer, P. M. (1990). "Endogenous Technological Change," Journal of Political Economy
98 (5), S71-102.
Schmookler, J. (1966). Invention and Economic Growth. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni-
versity Press
Slavin, R. E. (1990). "Achievement E⁄ects of Ability Grouping in Secondary Schools: A
Best-Evidence Synthesis," Review of Educational Research 60, 471-499.
Słrensen, A. (1999). "R&D, Learning, and Phases of Economic Growth," Journal of Eco-
nomic Growth 4(4), 429-45.
Spence, M. (1976). "Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic Competition," Review
or Economics Studies 43, 217-235.
United Nations Development Program. Human Development Report, various years. http:hdr.undp.org.
Uzawa, H. (1965). "Optimal Technical Change in an Aggregative Model of Economic
Growth," International Economic Review 6, 18-31.
Voitchovsky, S. (2005). "Does the Pro￿le of Income Inequality Matter for Economic Growth?
Distinguishing between the E⁄ects of Inequality in Di⁄erent Parts of the Income Distribu-
tion," Journal of Economic Growth, 10 (3), 273-96.
Zweim￿ller, J. (2000). "Schumpeterian Entrepreneurs Meet Engel￿ s Law: The Impact of
Inequality on Innovation-Driven Growth,"Journal of Economic Growth 5(2), 185-206.
28Mean Change SD Change
Grade  4 Grade  7 (%) Grade  4 Grade  7 (%)
African  American 196.50 214.30 9.06 12.51 15.89 27.02
Hispanic 196.50 214.60 9.21 12.03 15.55 29.26
Native  American 195.90 213.40 8.93 11.74 14.98 27.60
Non- Minority 204.10 226.00 10.73 11.69 15.26 30.54
Source: Author￿ s elaboration based on Table 15 in McCall et al., 2006, p17.
Notes: The scores (in RIT) scale refer to math tests taken in the fall of 2003.
Table 1: Mean and Standard Deviation in Math Test Scores
Country Mean  score Variance
Japan 534.14 116.31
Canada 532.49 88.75
Spain 485.11 90.80
United  States 482.89 104.93
Source: OECD (2005) Table A6.1; OECD PISA (2003), Table 4.1a.
Notes: The variance is a percentage of the OECD average.
Table 2: Dispersion in Educational Achievement
￿ ￿ ￿ z T ￿ ￿ a ￿ b r
0.3 0.3 1 1 20 0.02 0.6 100 0.05
Table 3: Baseline Parameters
Year Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest Gini
2002 3.5 8.8 14.8 23.3 49.7 0.462
1990 3.9 9.6 15.9 24 46.6 0.428
1980 4.3 10.3 16.9 24.9 43.7 0.403
1970 4.1 10.8 17.4 24.5 43.3 0.396
1967 4 10.8 17.3 24.2 43.8 0.399
Source:  Table  A- 3,  Carmen  DeNavas- Walt  et  al.  (2003)
Table 4: Quintiles and Gini Coe¢ cient
29Computers  Owned  by  Family
Variable Coefficient Std.  Error t- Statistic
Constant 59.9532 9.3032 6.4444
Income 0.3593 0.0542 6.6264
Gini - 0.7286 0.1846 - 3.9462
R- Square 0.5993
F- Stat 35.9008
Obs. 50
Table 5: Market Size and Inequality in the U.S.
Note: The coe¢ cients are estimated with a least square regression. Dependent variable:
percentage of families owning a computer. Indipendent variables: average family income, as a
percentage of that of the state with the highest income; the Gini ratio expressed in a 0 -100 scale.
30Cellular  Phones  2004 Internet  Use  2003
Variable Coefficient Std.  Error t- Statistic Variable Coefficient Std.  Error t- Statistic
Constant 18.0335 9.9611 1.8104 Constant 8.8575 5.6021 1.5811
GDP 1.9417 0.1344 14.4435 GDP 1.1694 0.0766 15.2738
Gini - 0.1617 0.2240 - 0.7217 Gini - 0.1852 0.1285 - 1.4413
R- squared 0.7485 R- squared 0.7485
F- statistic 127.9936 F- statistic 127.9936
Obs 89 Obs 95
Telephone  Mainline  2004 Telephone  Mainline  1990
Variable Coefficient Std.  Error t- Statistic Variable Coefficient Std.  Error t- Statistic
Constant 15.6767 4.3071 3.6398 Constant 7.8112 3.3508 2.3312
GDP 1.0997 0.0569 19.3268 GDP 0.9857 0.0453 21.7691
Gini - 0.2753 0.0966 - 2.8500 Gini - 0.2239 0.0766 - 2.9246
R- squared 0.8682 R- squared 0.8702
F- statistic 253.6773 F- statistic 305.0770
Obs 80 Obs 94
Table 6: Market Size and Inequality: Cross-Country
Source: Author￿ s elaboration based on data drawn from the Human Development Report 2006.
Notes: The dependent variables, indicated at the top of each table, is expressed as a percentage of
that of the country with the highest ￿gure. The independent variables are i) per capita average
gross domestic product (GDP) in purchasing power parity terms, as a percentage of per capita
GDP of the richest country (Luxemburg) in 2004; ii) The Gini ratio. This is computed by the
UNDP on the basis of household surveys taken at di⁄erent years, mostly in the last decade.
31Number  of  Researchers
Variable Coefficient Std.  Error t- Statistic
Constant 28.9506 7.9921 3.6224
GDP 0.8179 0.1012 8.0816
Gini - 0.6572 0.1814 - 3.6227
R- squared 0.6489
F- statistic 60.0555
Obs 68
Table 7: Inequality and Number of Researchers
Source: See Table (6). Notes: For explanations on the independent variables see Table (6).
Researchers are people trained to work in any ￿eld of science who are engaged in professional
research and development activity. Most such jobs require the completion of tertiary education.
The ￿gures on the number of researchers refer to the most recent year available during the period
1990-2003. In the regression they are expressed as a percentage of that of the country with the
highest value.
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(ascending lines). The three graphs in the middle row show the behavior of the price of an
invention. The three graphs at the bottom row show the movements of the innovation rate. All
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